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There  exist  optimal  symmetric  equilibria  in  the  Green-Porter  model  [4,  S]  hav- 
ing  an elementary  intertemporal  structure.  Such  an equilibrium  is described  entirely 
by two  subsets of price  space and  two  quantities,  the  only production  levels used  by 
firms  in  any  contingency.  The  central  technique  employed  in  the  analysis  is  the 
reduction  of the  repeated  game  to  a  family  of static  games. Journal  of Economic 
Literature  Classification  Numbers:  026,  611.  Q  1986  Academic  press.  IW. 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
A  subject  of major  interest  in  oligopoly  theory  is the  nature  and  degree 
of implicit  collusion  that  can  be  sustained  amongst  quantity-setting  firms, 
via  strategies  that  make  output  levels  at  time  t depend  upon  aspects  of the 
history  of  the  oligopoly  prior  to  t.  The  scope  of  such  strategies  clearly  is 
limited  by  the  extent  of  the  firms’  knowledge  of  that  history.  By  far  the 
most  attention  has been  given  to  the  case in  which  the  production  levels  of 
all  firms  in  each  previous  period  are  common  knowledge  (see, for  example, 
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Friedman  [3]  and  Abreu  [ 11).  The  consequences  of invoking  the  opposite 
polar  assumption  about  information  are  explored  in  two  important  papers 
by  Porter  [S]  and  Green  and  Porter  [4].  In  their  setting,  firms  cannot 
observe  one  another’s  past  production  levels;  thus  the  actions  of a firm  are 
functions  only  of  past  prices,  and  possibly  of  the  firm’s  own  quantity 
history.  Information  about  the  history  of production  is further  obscured  by 
the  fact  that  there  is  a stochastic  component  to  the  market  price;  the  level 
of  aggregate  production  cannot  be  inferred  precisely  from  the  price.  Our 
paper  exhibits  strategies  for  the  firms  in  the  Green-Porter  model  that  form 
optimal  symmetric  sequential  equilibria  [7]  of the  discounted  oligopolistic 
supergame.  The  equilibria  have  an  extremely  simple  intertemporal  struc- 
ture,  and  their  optimality  is  established  under  very  general  conditions. 
Porter  [8]  studies  the  problem  of  how  to  maximize  discounted  profits 
with  strategies  based  on  trigger  prices  and  Cournot-Nash  reversion.  He 
assumes  that  firms  produce  some  quantity  q  less than  the  Cournot-Nash 
amount,  until  the  price  drops  below  a  trigger  price  p  in  some  period. 
Thereafter,  all  firms  produce  their  Cournot-Nash  quantities  for  T periods, 
after  which  they  return  to  q  (which  is  maintained  until  price  again  falls 
beIow 8,  and  so on).  Porter  characterizes  the  choice  of q, p,  and  T (the  lat- 
ter  may  be  infinite)  that  yields  cartel  members  the  greatest  discounted 
profit,  subject  to  the  constraint  that  the  resulting  regime  must  be a sequen- 
tial  equilibrium. 
The  optimization  described  above  is  severely  limited  in  that  it  restricts 
attention  to  a  small  subset  of  the  strategies  available  to  cartel  members. 
Included  among  the  restrictions  implicitly  imposed  by  Porter  are  the 
following: 
(i)  The  critical  set  of prices  that  trigger  T periods  of “punishment” 
is of the  form  [O,p],  that  is,  a  tail  test  is  used. 
(ii)  The  trigger  price  at  time  t is independent  of prices  prior  to  t -  1, 
so review strategies  such  as those  used  by  Radner  [9]  are  ruled  out. 
(iii)  Only  one  punishment  is used:  a firm  cannot  increase  its  quantity 
by  different  amounts,  or  for  a  different  number  of  periods,  depending  on 
how low  the  preceding  price  was. 
(iv)  A firm’s  output  at  t cannot  be a function  of its  previous  outputs. 
(v)  Punishments  more  severe than  Cournot-Nash  reversion  are  not 
permitted  (see Abreu  [ 1 I). 
Porter  understands  that  a  global  optimum  may  not  be  achieved  by 
equilibria  of  the  sort  he  considers,  and  explains  that  complexity  poses  a 
major  problem:  “Since  we will  later  allow  the  cartel  to  maximize  joint  value 
subject  to  enforcement  constraints,  the  restriction  to  simple  trigger 
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to  better  outcomes...  Unfortunately,  models  with  strategies  such  as  these 
are  extremely  complicated  for  computational  purposes,  and  it  is dif~~~~t  to 
obtain  any  interesting  results.”  [S,  p. 3161. 
After  modifying  the  model  (Sect.  2)  by  replacing  the  continuum  of 
possible  production  levels  with  a discrete  production  set for  each  player,  we 
are  able  to  dispense  with  all  five  restrictions  listed  above.  We  find  that 
there  exist  equilibria  of surprising  simplicity  which  are  optimal  among  all 
pure  strategy  symmetric  sequential  equilibria.’  In  these  equilibria,  only  two 
quantities  are  ever  produced.  To  compute  which  quantity  to  produce  in 
period  t  a firm  simply  needs  to  remember  the  price  in  the  previous  period 
and  which  quantity  was  specified  by  the  equilibrium  in  that  previous 
period.  Thus  the  sequence  of  equilibrium  production  levels  is  a  Markov 
chain.  In  fact,  (ii),  (iii),  and  (iv)  above  are  satisfied  by  these  optimal 
equilibria:  once  (i)  and  (v)  are  relaxed  Porter’s  remaining  conditions  are 
unrestrictive!  These  results  require  only  mild  regularity  assumptions  on 
demand,  and  the  stochastic  disturbance  in  price  can  enter  in  a  rather 
general  way. 
The  central  technique  employed  is  the  reduction  of the  repeated  game  to 
a  static  structure  from  which  can  be  extracted  the  optimal  equilibria  in 
question  (and  indeed,  equilibria  supporting  any  symmetric  equilibrium 
payoff  vector).  The  analysis  has  a  strong  flavor  of dynamic  programming, 
and  is  in  the  tradition  of  the  stochastic  game  literature  beginning  with 
Shapley  [ 121  as well  as the  more  recent  papers  of Abreu  [I  f  and  Radner, 
yerson,  and  Maskin  [lo].  Notice  that  every  pure  strategy  symm~tr~e 
sequential  equilibrium  (hereafter  SSE)  must  prescribe  other  “suCcessor’- 
SSE’s  to  follow  each  one-period  price  history  (we  show  that  quantity 
histories  can  be  ignored).  One  can  imagine  constructing  a  new game  by 
truncating  the  discounted  supergame  as  follows:  after  each  first-period 
lace  the  SSE  successor by  the  payoffs  associated  with  that  suc- 
cessor.  The  first-period  equilibrium  quantities  will  still  constitute  an 
equilibrium  of the  new game,  and  the  resulting  total  payoffs  will  also  be the 
same.  More  generally  (if  less intuitively),  for  any  bounded  set  IV  of  real 
numbers,  let  B(W)  c  R  represent  the  total  payoffs  that  players  could 
receive  in  pure  strategy  equilibria  of  truncated  games  in  which  each  first- 
period  price  is followed  by  some  symmetric  payoff  drawn  from  l+‘.  At  the 
end  of the  single  period  of the  truncated  game,  firms  receive  their  conven- 
tional  one-period  profits,  plus  some  element  of  W  (the  same  for  each 
player),  depending  on  the  price  that  arises;  the  expected  value  of this  sum, 
discounted  to  the  beginning  of the  period,  will  be  one  element  of 
W  is  said  to  be  self-generating  (in  the  context  of  a  particular 
1 Abraham  Neyman  pointed  out  to  us  that  an  extension  to  mixed  strategies  would  not  be  as 
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game)  if  W_C B( IV).  Let  V be  the  set  of payoffs  a player  can  receive  in  the 
various  SSE’s  of  the  repeated  game.  Section  3  establishes  that  every  self- 
generating  set is  a  subset  of  I’.  Moreover,  V itself  is  self-generating.  Con- 
sequently  V is  the  largest  bounded  fixed  point  of the  set-valued  map  B. 
Section  4 proves  that  for  any  compact  set  W,  the  image  under  B  of  W  is 
the  same  as  the  image  of  the  extreme  points  of  W.  This  proposition  is 
analogous  to  bang-bang  theorems  in  optimal  control  theory  (see,  for 
example,  Artstein  [2]).  Together  with  the  results  of the  previous  section,  it 
yields  an  elementary  proof  that  V  is  compact  (see  Sect. 5),  so  best  and 
worst  SSE’s  exist  whenever  V is nonempty.  Its  implication  for  the  repeated 
game  is  a dramatic  dimensional  simplification.  If  u is  the  payoff  associated 
with  any  SSE,  v can  be  supported  by  an  SSE  which  in  every  contingency 
(except  for  the  first  period)  looks  like  the  first  period  of either  the  best  or 
the  worst  SSE.  The  first  period  of the  equilibrium  yielding  r~  is no  longer  an 
exception  if  v is  the  optimal  element  of  V.  These  results  are  explained  in 
detail  in  Section  6,  which  presents  in  addition  a result  on  the  sensitivity  of 
maximal  cartel  profits  to  changes  in  the  discount  rate. 
The  conclusion  raises  the  possibility  of applying  the  analytic  approach 
taken  here  to  other  classes of repeated  games. 
2.  THE  MODEL 
The  structure  presented  here  is based  entirely  upon  the  model  developed 
in  Porter  [S]  and  Green  and  Porter  [4].  Departures  from  their 
assumptions  are  noted  below.  The  oligopoly  is  modelled  by  an  N-person 
infinitely  repeated  game  with  discounting.  The  first  step  in  defining  the 
game  is  to  specify  the  single-period  component  game  G. 
The  Single-Period  Game 
N  identical  firms  simultaneously  choose  quantities  qi,  i=  l,...,  N,  of out- 
put  to  produce.  Whereas  in  [8]  all  non-negative  output  levels  are  feasible, 
we assume  that  there  is  an  indivisibility  in  production:  only  integer  mul- 
tiples  of  some  fundamental  unit  of  production  (which,  of course,  may  be 
arbitrarily  small)  can  be  produced.  This  assumption  simplifies  the 
mathematics  involved  in  Section  4. While  it  is a departure  from  tradition,  it 
would  appear  to  represent  an  increase  in  realism.  Firms  incur  a  total 
production  cost  c(q;)  >  0  ([S]  requires  constant  marginal  cost).  Market 
price  p  is  a  random  variable  whose  distribution  T(p;  q)  depends  on 
aggregate  production  q. In  [S],  the  inverse  demand  function  is linear  in  4, 
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p =  a +  bq +  6  or  p =  (a  +  bq)  0.  We  dispense  with  these  assumptions.  The 
payoff  of firm  i  given  p  is 
where  q,  is  the  quantity  produced  by  firm  j.  Firms  maximize  expected 
profit.  We  will  denote  by  Ei  the  expected  value  of  rci  (assumption  (Al) 
below  guarantees  that  “i  is  well  defined),  that  is, 
where  p(q)  =  j?  p dT(p;  q).  Thus  the  one-period  game  is  given  by 
G =  (S, )...) s,;  5, )...) EN),  where  Si=  (0,  1, 2 ,... },  i=  I,.,.,  N. 
We  assume  that: 
(Al)  There  exists  a  constant  K  such  that  q.p(q)  6  K  for  all  qe  S! _ 
(Note  that  S1 =  Cf=  1 S,.) 
(A2)  T(p;  q)  is  absolutely  continuous  in  p,  Let  g(p;  q)  be  the 
corresponding  probability  density. 
(A3)  The  set .Q =  (pJg(p;  q)  >  0}  is contained  in  +  and  is indepen- 
dent  of qES1. 
This  assumption,  which  will  later  be  relaxed  slightly,  ensures  that  under 
no  circumstances  will  firms  be  able  to  infer  from  the  price  that  with 
probability  1, someone  has  deviated  from  equilibrium  behavior.  Ability  to 
make  such  inferences  substantially  changes  the  nature  of the  problem. 
(Ah)  c(0)  =  0,  c(q)  3  0 for  all  q E S,,  and  there  exist  c0 >  0  and  q. >  Q 
such  that  c(q)  3  cO. q for  all  q 3  qo. 
(A5)  G  has  a symmetric  Nash  equilibrium  (in  pure  strategies). 
The  Repeated  Game  G”(6). 
G”(6)  is  the  infinitely  repeated  game  defined  by  the  component  game  G 
and  the  discount  factor  SE  (0,  1).  A  strategy  gr  for  firm  i  specifies  an 
output  in  each  period  t =  1, 2,...,  as  a  function  of  past  prices 
P l-l  =  (p(l),...,p(r-  1))  and  the  firm’s  own  past  quantities  qj -  I = 
(qi(l),..,,  qi(t-1)).  Thus  oi=(ai(l),  a,(2),...),  where  ai(l)ESi  an 
a,(t):  Q’-’  x Si’-r  +  Si  is a  (Lebesgue)  measurable  function  for  each  t 3  2. 
A  strategy  profile  c  has  the  form  g =  (cT~?...,  a,),  and  for  each  t 3  2, 
a(t)(p’-  ‘;  qrM1)  =  (al  (t)(p’-  ‘;  4:-l),...,  oN(f)(pr-  ‘;  q;‘)),  where  q’-  ’ = 
(q(l),...,  q(i-  I)),  and  q(s)  =  (ql  (s),...,  qds)),  s  =  L...,  f-  1. 256  ABREU,  PEARCE,  AND  STACCHETTI 
Given  a history  H(t)  =  (p’;  qf)  and  a strategy  profile  c’, we will  denote  by 
CJ/  H(tj  the  strategy  profile  induced  by  u on  the  subtree  following  H(t).  Thus, 
for  any  sequence  of  prices  p(l),...,  p(s)  and  any  sequence  of  quantity  vec- 
tors  ~(1 I,...,  Y(S), 
4  If(r) (s +  1 w  Y”) 
=  4s  +  t +  1 )(P(l  )Y..,  p(t),  P(1 L  p(s);  q(l),...,  q(t),  Y(l),...,  Y(S)). 
Given  a  strategy  profile  g,  a  path  (q(l),  q(2)($),  q(3)(p2),...)  for  the 
game  is  generated  in  the  following  way.  In  the  first  period  firms  produce 
q(1)  =  (crl (l),...,  ~~(1))  and  a  price  p(l)  arises  from  the  density 
g(.;~iN_lqi(l)).  In  period  t,  t>2,  firms  produce  q(t)@-I)= 
a(t)(p(l),...,p(t-  1);  q(l),...,  q(t-  l)(piP2)),  and  the  market  price  p(t)  is 
drawn  from  the  density  g(.  ; cyzl  qj(t)(pfpl)).  The  value  ui(cr)  of  the 
strategy  profile  n  for  firm  i  is  the  present  discounted  value  of  expected 
payoffs  in  every  period.  Define 
R,(o;  t)=sb*  ...  jam  71i(4(t)(P’-‘);P(t))‘g 
( P(l);  f  qj(l)  '  "' 
j=l  J 
'g 
i 
Ptt)i  f  4j(t)(Pf-')  dP(1)...dP(t). 
j=  1  1 
Then 
ui(o)=  f  6’~R,(cq  f). 
t=1 
Single-period  payoffs  are  received  at  the  end  of  each  period;  U,(a)  is  the 
value  of the  infinite  stream  discounted  to  the  beginning  of period  1. 
We  use  sequential  equilibrium  (see  Kreps  and  Wilson  [7])  as  the 
solution  concept  in  the  repeated  game.  A  strategy  profile  g  is  symmetric  if 
01(t)=(T2(t)=  ...  =  oN(t)  for  all  t 3  1. (A5)  guarantees  the  existence  of a 
symmetric  sequential  equilibrium  in  pure  strategies  (SSE),  because  the 
strategy  profile  specifying  that  in  every  period,  independently  of  the 
history,  each  firm  produces  its  Cournot-Nash  output  is  easily  shown  to  be 
a  sequential  equilibrium.’  Therefore  the  set 
is  nonempty. 
V=  {ul(o)la  is  an  SSE} 
‘We  abuse  terminology  throughout  by  referring  to  a  profile  CJ as  a  sequential  equilibrium. 
Technically,  we  mean  that  there  exists  a  system  of  beliefs  p  such  that  (p,  (T)  is  a  sequential 
equilibrium.  Extensions  to  repeated  games  of  the  ideas  of  consistency  and  sequential 
rationality  used  in  defining  a  sequential  equilibrium  are  immediate. OPTIMAL  CARTEL  EQUILIBRIA  257 
Assumption  (Al)  and  the  fact  that  supergame  payoffs  are  discounted 
imply  the  existence  of a bounded  set 3 c  S,  such  that  any  strategy  for firm  i 
specifying  (in  any  contingency)  an  action  qi$  3,  is  strongly  dominated. 
(Al)  there  exists  K >  0  such  that  q .8(q)  <  K  for  all  q E S, . Note  that  for 
any  4,YESI2 
Since  c(q) >  0 for  all  q E S,,  the  maximum  single-period  payoff  for  player 
i  is  bounded  by  K,  and  consequently  the  maximum  supergame  payoff  for 
player  E’is bounded  by  6K/(l--6).  For  any  q>q*=max(q,,  K/(~,(l-6)))~ 
the  maximum  supergame  payoff  that  firm  i faces if it  produces  the  quantity 
q,  for  any  aggregate  production  y E S,  for  the  rest  of the  firms,  is  bounded 
bY 
6”  (q.j(q+y)-c(q)+6K/(l  -S,}  <6.  (K-coy-MKl(1  -S)}  CO, 
and  since  firm  i  can  always  choose  to  produce  q =  0  (and  therefore  get  a 
supergame  payoff  of 0),  firm  i  will  only  consider  production  quantities  in 
z=  [0,  q*]  n  S,.  This  fact  can  be  used  to  slightly  relax  assumption  (A3) 
by  requiring  only  that  the  set  Q  defined  there  be  contained  in  B,  an 
independent  of (ql  ,..., qN) E 3”‘. 
In  the  course  of  the  previous  argument  we  Rave  shown  that 
VE  [O, 6K/( 1 -  S)],  hence  V is  bounded. 
3.  REDUCTION  TO  A  ONE-PERIOD  PROBLEM 
For  each  repeated  game  G”(6),  we define  below  a function  B:  2’  --f 2’, 
where  2R  is  the  power  set of the  real  numbers.  From  this  function  one  can 
recover  V, the  set of all  payoffs  received  by  a player  in  various  SSE’s  (sym- 
metric  sequential  equilibria).  B  provides  a  simple  method  of constructing 
an  SSE  giving  any  desired  payoff  u E V  to  each  firm.  The  function  B  is 
related  to  a class of truncated  games  associated  with  G”(6)  as described  in 
the  Introduction.  This  relationship  is  developed  in  what  follows,  to  give 
intuitive  motivation  for  the  definitions  and  propositions;  it  is  not  needed 
for  any  of  the  formal  results.  The  following  definitions  implicitly  depend 
upon  a  particular  game  G”(6). 
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DEFINITION.  Given  a  set  II’s  R,  a  pair  (q,  U)  with  q E 3,  and  U: Q  -+  W 
(Lebesgue)  measurable,  is  admissible  with  respect  to  W  if  it  satisfies  the 
following  incentive  compatibility  constraints: 
5l (4.  eN)  +  jQ U(P)  .g(p;  N.  q)  dp 
8e,(4q.eN-l)+  u(p).g(p;(N-l).q+~)dp  I  for  all  q E S, 
Q 
where  e,,, =  (l,...,  1) E RN. 
Hereafter,  for  a  vector  (ql ,..., qN)  E nj!=  i gj  and  a  measurable  function 
u: R,  -+ R,  we use the  notation 
Ej(q,  >...,  qN;  u)  =  6 C(q1,...,  q&l  +  JQ  4~)  ‘g  (P;  ;:I  qj)  dP] 
for  all  i =  l,...,  N. 
DEFINITION.  For  each  Ws  R  define 
B( w)  = IEl  (4 ’ eN7  . u)l(q,  U)  is  admissible  with  respect  to  W}. 
Let  Q  and  U  be  functions  with  domain  B(W)  such  that  for  every 
w  E B(W),  (Q(W),  U(W))  is  admissible  with  respect  to  W,  and 
w  =  E,  (Q(W)  e,;  U(W)).  Such  a  pair  of  functions  exists  (there  may  be 
many;  if  so,  choose  one  pair)  by  the  definition  of  B(W).  Notice  that 
B(W)  c  6(co(  W)  +  iti($...,  s)>,  so B(W)  is  bounded  when  W  is  bounded. 
(Here,  co(W)  denotes  the  convex  hull  of  W.) 
An  alternative  definition  of B(W)  can  be  given  via  a class  of one-period 
games  that  are  modifications  of  the  component  game  G.  For  any 
measurable  function  U:  R,  --f W,  define  G(u;  6) =  (3 ,..., 3;  E,  ( . ; U) ,..., 
EN(.  ; u)).  This  is the  same  game  as G,  except  that  players’  payoffs  are  the 
sum  of their  payoffs  in  G  and  the  expected  value  of the  reward  function  U, 
all  discounted  by  6.  If  (q,...,  q)  is  a  Nash  equilibrium  of  G(u;  6),  then  by 
definition  (q,  U)  is  admissible  with  respect  to  W  and  El(q.  e,;  u)  E B(W). 
Conversely,  any  w  E B( W)  is  the  payoff  associated  with  some  symmetric 
pure  strategy  equilibrium  of  G(u;  6),  for  some  U: 52 -+  W.  In  other  words, 
the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  invoked  in  the  definition  of  the 
admissibility  of  (q,  U)  precisely  express  the  fact  that  for  any  player  with 
payoff  function  Ej(  ; u),  q is  a best  response  to  (q,...,  q). 
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PROPQSITION  1 (Self-generation).  For  any  bounded set  WE 
implies B( W) E  Y. 
Proof.  The  idea  of  the  proof  is  to  exhibit,  for  each  u’ E B(W),  an  SSE 
C+(W)  with  u,(ci(w))  =  w for  all  i=  l,...,  N.  With  Q  and  U  as defined  above, 
for  each  w  E B(W),  let  U’(w)  =  w, U’(w)  =  U(w),  and 
U’(w)(p’)=  U(U’~‘(w)(p’~‘))(P(t))  for  all  pr E L?’  and  f =  2, J,.... 
The  functions  U’  are  well  defined  because  W,  the  range  oi  U,  is  contained 
in  B(W),  the  domain  of  U.  For  each  M’E B( W),  define  the  symmetric 
strategy  profile  8(w)  by 
&;(w)(l)=  Q(w)  and  b<(w)(t+  1 )(p’;  qf)=  Q(U’(w)(p’)),  I=  1, 2,.... 
Notice  that  &(w)(t  +  1)  does  not  depend  on  the  quantity  history 
q’=  (q(f),...,  y(t));  consequently  when  referring  to  tilHCr,,  we will  write  ~3j~,~ 
suppressing  the  redundant  quantity  arguments  of  N(t)  =  (p’;  q’).  We  first 
show that  the  value  of 6(w)  for  each  player  is  1~. Since 
Q(~‘(w)(P’))  =  Q(~‘-‘(U(N(P(~  ))NP(~),...,  ~(t))),~ 
one  can  check  that 
3w)l p(1,=4Yw)(PC~)J). 
By  definition  of the  functions  Q  and  U,  we have 
u:=6  n,(&(w).e~)+~~U(w)(p).g(P;~.Qili!)dp~. 
i  i 
Also,  by  definition 
ui(ci(w))=d 
i 
fi(b(w’)(l))+/  &(6(W)i,)‘g(p;  N’&(M;)(l))  tip 
R  1 
for  all  i =  l,...,  N. 
But  ~?(w)(l)=Q(w)~e,  and  d(w)j,=&(U(~)(~)).  Therefore 
w-“i(6(w))=s  J  { u(w)(P)-uU,(~(U(w’)(p)))}  ‘g(p;  74. Q(W))  dp3 
.a 
3 It  is  understood  that  when  I=  1,  the  right  side  of  this  eqnality  becomes 
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SO 
Iw-uj(fqw))l  cq  sup  Ix-  tJi(6(X))l  .g(p;  N.  Q(w))  4. 
0 xsS(W) 
Since  g is  a probability  density,  and  the  above  inequality  holds  for  every 
wEB( 
SUP  IW-Uj(S(W))i  <6’  SUP  /X-Vi(6(X))j. 
WEB(W)  XEB(W) 
However,  since  3  is  compact  and  B(W)  is  bounded,  the  last  inequality 
implies  that 
sup  ~w-vi(8(w))l  =o. 
WEB(W) 
Hence  ui(&(w))  =  w for  each  w  E B( W)  and  i =  l,...,  N. 
Next  we  show  that  C?(W) is  a  Nash  equilibrium  for  each  w  E B(W). 
Because  G”(6)  and  8(w)  are  symmetric  in  players,  it  is  sufficient  to  work 
only  with  player  1.  Define  the  subsets  of  strategies  for  the  first  player 
C(t,  x),  t =  1, 2 )...) x E W,  in  the  following  way:  z E C(t,  x)  if z(s) =  til  (x)(s) 
for  all  s>  t.  Also  let  (r,  K,(x))  =  (7, 8,(x)  ,..., B,,,(x)).  We  first  show  that 
for  t>  1,  if  ~~(2, S-,(x))<01(8(x))  for  all  z~C(t,  x)  and  all  XE  W,  then 
v~(z,~~1(~))6v~(~(~))forallz~~(t+1,~)andallx~W.Letx~  Wand 
z E C(t  +  1, x).  Notice  that 
Then 
71  (p,r(l)) E  C(t,  WXNP))  for  all  p E 0. 
%(5  S-,(x))=6  %(2(l),  Q(x).eN-l)+ 




66  E1($l),  Q(x).~~-~) 
1 
+s  01 (~(U(X)(P)))  .dp;  ~(1)  +  (N-  1) * Q(x))  dp 
52 
=J  cl(z(l),  Q(x).~~-~) 
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66  ~l(Q!x).eN)i-{  U(xi(~)-elp;‘.Q(x):di?) 
n 
(since(Q(x),  U(x))  is admissible  w.r.t.  W) 
=  x =  v1 (c?(x)). 
For  t=l,  z~x(l,~)  only  if  z=~(x).  Thus  v~(~~~~~(x))=v,(~(x-)).  We 
have  then  shown,  by  induction,  that  for  every  t >  1,  no  player  wishes  to 
deviate  from  6(x)  in  the  first  t  periods  given  that  he  must  conform  with 
6(x)  thereafter. 
Finally,  assume  that  there  exist  w  E IV,  a  strategy  o1  for  player  1  an 
E >  0  such  that 
But  for  T  sufficiently  large, 
Therefore  the  strategy  o?  EC(T,  W)  defined  by  o?(t)  =  o1 (t)  for  all 
l=  l,.,.,  T-  1, satisfies 
Vl(G,  e-  1  (w))  3  w  $  e/2. 
This  is a  contradiction.  Therefore  B(w)  is  a Nash  equilibrium. 
It  remains  only  to  show  that  for  each  w  E B(W),  C?(W)  is  a  sequential 
equilibrium.  Let  player  i’s  beliefs  at  an  information  set  following  price 
history  pr,  when  i has  followed  some  strategy  ci,  be  generated  by  the  belief 
that  the  profile  (8,  (w),..., 8,-1(w),  [Ti, bi+  1  (w),..., c?~(M’)) is  being  followed 
(with  certainty),  where  iri=(oi(l)  ,..., oi(t),ri,(t+l),~,(t+2)  ,... ).  The 
problem  of consistency  (see [7])  does  not  arise,  because  (A3)  ensures  tinat 
every  price  observation  is  compatible  with  the  above  beliefs.  Note  that 
actions  prior  to  period  (t +  1)  do  not  affect  payoffs  from  (t +  1)  onward, 
and  B(W)  is  independent  of  quantity  histories.  Therefore  beliefs  about  the 
past  are  irrelevant,  and  to  demonstrate  sequential  rationality,  it  is sufficient 
to  show that  after  every  price  history,  the  profile  induced  by  6(w)  on  t 
“‘remainder  supergame”  is  a  Nash  equilibrium.  Now,  for  any  price  history 
PI,  t 3  1, 
6(W)l,f  = cq Uf(w)(pZ)). 
Since  w* =  U’(w)(p’)  E W,  and  we  have  just  shown  that  a(x)  is  a  Nash 
equilibrium  for  all  x E B(W),  6(w)  is an  SSE.  Q.E.D. 262  ABREU,PEARCE,AND  STACCHETTI 
(A3)  implies  that  “essentially”  there  are no  unreached  information  sets in 
equilibrium,  since  a  player  can  only  see himself  deviate  and  any  price  is 
consistent  with  equilibrium  behavior  for  the  other  players.  Hence,  Nash 
equilibria  are  essentially  sequential  and  any  Nash  equilibrium  c  can  be 
transformed  into  an  SSE  o’  which  is  independent  of  quantities  and 
generates  the  same  (modulo  sets of measure  zero)  stochastic  process  of out- 
comes  as U. 
Our  proof  could  be  shortened  somewhat  by  noting  that  the  strategies 
c?(w) are  “unimprovable”  (in  no  contingency  is  a  one-shot  deviation 
profitable)  and  invoking  an  important  result  from  dynamic  programming 
(see especiahy  Howard  [.5]  and  Kreps  [6])  stating  that  an  unimprovable 
strategy  is  optimal  after  any  history. 
The  idea  of the  proof  of Proposition  1 can  be explained  informally  using 
the  modified  component  games  described  earlier.  Suppose  that  UT  E B(W) 
for  some  self-generating  set  W. Any  SSE  with  value  w  has  to  specify  some  q 
for  all  firms  to  produce  in  the  first  period,  and  “successor”  SSE’s  for  each 
price  p( 1)  that  might  arise.  These  successor  profiles  implicitly  generate  a 
“future  reward  function”  u(p).  Begin  to  construct  a(w)  (of  Proposition  1) 
by  choosing  a pair  (q; U)  that  is admissible  with  respect  to  W, and  satisfies 
w=  E,  (q,..., q; u).  b(w)  specifies  that  each  firm  produce  q in  period  1, and 
implicitly  “promises”  future  rewards  u(p)  for  each  p( 1)  that  might  arise. 
(For  the  moment,  postpone  worrying  about  how  8(w)  will  provide  SSE’s 
that  deliver  the  promised  utilities.)  If  each  firm  takes  these  future  rewards 
as given,  essentially  the  modified  game  G(u;  6)  is  being  played  in  the  first 
period  of the  supergame,  and  (q,..., q) is an  equilibrium  of that  game.  Since 
for  all  p,  u(p)  is in  W,  it  is  possible,  following  any  first-period  price  p(l), 
for  G(w)  to  “deliver”  u(p(1))  by  choosing  another  admissible  pair  (r, v) 
with  u(p(  1)) =  E, (r,...,  r; v),  specifying  that  r  be  produced  in  period  2,  and 
“promising”  future  rewards  24~42))  beyond  period  2. Again,  if firms  believe 
that  v(p(2))  will  occur  if p(2)  is  the  realization  of  the  price  in  the  second 
period,  it  is  optimal  for  them  to  produce  (r,..., r),  an  equilibrium  of  the 
game  G(v;  6).  Repeating  this  process,  one  can  generate,  for  any  given  t, 
quantities  to  be  produced  by  obedient  firms  in  the  first  t  periods  for  every 
possible  history;  in  fact,  the  proof  of the  proposition  uses an  inductive  step 
to  define  c?(w)(t) for  all  t. This  produces  a  strategy  profile  from  which  no 
one  wishes  to  deviate  in  only  one  period  (admissibility  of the  (q, U)  pair 
invoked  in  each  contingency  guarantees  this).  Finally,  unimprovability 
implies  that  no  firm  will  deviate  from  c?(w) even  if  it  is  free  to  do  so  in 
infinitely  many  periods. 
PROPOSITION  2 (Factorization).  V=  B(V). 
ProoJ  Consider  w  E  V.  We  show  that  w  E B( V).  By  definition,  there 
exists  an  SSE  (T  such  that  vi(o)=  w,  i=  l,...,  N.  Define  q=a,  (1)  and OPTIMAL  CARTEL  EQUILIBRIA  263 
u: Q  --f R  by  u(p)  =  u1 (cr\CP,oCln) for  every  p E -Q+ Since  0  is  a  symmetric 
strategy  profile,  0,(1)=0,(l)  for  all  i=2  ,..., It’,  and  ~l(~,~~~), is  also  sym- 
metric.  By  (A3)  the  information  sets  (p,  ~~(1)).  i=  I,...,  N  are  reached  in 
equilibrium  for  all  p E 52. Because  5  is a sequential  equihbrium,  this  implies 
that  Q/ (P,~Cljj is  a sequential  equilibrium  too.  Hence  D[ IP.O(z  )) is an  SSE  and 
u(p)  =  zir (crl CP,OCljj)  E I/’  for  all  p E 52. By  definition, 
E,(q.e,;u)=d 
i 
%iq-e,)+jr  MPl~$(p;N.q)~p 
a  1 
=  uj (5)  =  w, 
and  to  complete  the  proof  we need  only  check  that  the  pair  (4, u)  satisfies 
the  incentive  compatibility  constraints  of  admissibility.  For  any  YG 3, 
define  0;  by  o$(l)=y  and  ~~j~P,~~=~l~~P~y~  for  all  PEQ  and  r~s.  Then 
o  is  a Nash  equilibrium,  therefore  U, (Q) >  ol ((T:,  cd. 1  ),  that  is, 
as required.  This  establishes  that  VL  B(V).  By  Proposition  1, 8(  V) G  V. 
QED. 
In  any  SSE  C, the  value  to  firm  i  of the  successor  SW  specified  following 
a  given  first-period  price  p  must  be  independent  of  the  quantity  that  i 
produced  in  period  1 (this  is  because  no  one  else  has  observed  that  quan- 
tity,  and  hence  i  faces the  same  future  environment  regardless  of his  initial 
output  level).  Thus  the  value  of G for  each  player  can  be factorized  into  two 
terms:  the  profit  from  first-period  production,  and  the  discounted  expected 
value  of a reward  function  u(p)=  c~(~\~~~~,,~~~~~).  Since  cr.j(pl,bO(liJ is  an  SSE, 
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that  the  firms  are  willing  to  produce  ~(1)  =  (q,..., q)  in  period  1,  means 
precisely  that  (q, U) is  admissible  with  respect  to  V. Thus  the  requirements 
for  (T to  be  an  SSE  are  exactly  those  needed  for  u(a)  to  be  in  B(V),  and 
therefore  V =  B( V). 
COROLLARY  1.  For  every  w  E V,  there  exists  an  SSE  CJ such  that 
v1  ((T) =  w  andfor  every  t >  1, o(t)  is independent  of the  quantity  components 
of the  history  H(t)=  (p(l)  ,..., p(t);  q(1) ,..., q(t)). 
ProoJ:  For  each  w  E V,  b(w)  (defined  in  Proposition  1) is  such  an  SSE. 
Q.E.D. 
We  have  shown  that  V  can  be  recovered  from  the  function  B.  By 
Proposition  2,  V is a fixed  point  of B;  Proposition  1 implies  V is the  largest 
bounded  fixed  point  of B.  Moreover,  since  V is self-generating,  any  element 
w of  V  is  the  payoff  of  G(w),  the  SSE  constructed  in  Proposition  1. This 
supergame  equilibrium  is described  entirely  by  two  functions  Q  and  U,  and 
the  number  w. Sections  4  and  5  prove  that  U  may  be  chosen  to  have  a 
“bang-bang”  property  tha  makes  the  intertemporal  structure  of  the 
equilibrium  entirely  elementary. 
4.  BANG-BANG  REWARD  FUNCTIONS 
Proposition  4 shows  that  if the  pair  (q, ti)  is  admissible  with  respect  to  a 
compact  set  IV,  there  exists  a  function  U  taking  on  only  the  two  values 
G=max  W  and  Y=  min  W,  such  that  (q, ti)  is  admissible  and 
E,  (q ,..., q; U) =  E,  (q ,..., q; ti),  that  is,  the  value  is  unchanged.  As  a  con- 
sequence,  if  V  is  compact  (as  Sect. 5  will  establish),  each  function  U(x), 
x E V, used  in  constructing  8(w)  can  be chosen  to  have  range  {_v,  17). 
PROPOSITION  3.  Let  (q, ~2)  be an admissible  pair  with  respect  to a compact 
set  WE  R.  Let  w  =  min  W  and  W=  max  W.  Then  there  exists  a function 
U: Q  +  {w, I?>  such  that  (q, U)  is  admissible  with  respect  to  W  and 
E,  (a...,  q; 4  =  E,  (q,..., q; fi). 
Prooj  Define  the  sets 
p(q)  =  {u:  Q  -+ co( W)l(q,  U) is admissible  w.r.t.  co(W)>, 
=  {u:  LJ +  co( w)] El  (y, q.  e,-  r ; U) 6  El  (q * e,;  U) for all  y E s}, 
and 
F=  (~~,u(q)lEl(q~eN;  u)=El(q.eN;  cl>. 
Since  for  each  y E 3,  E,  (y, q.  eN _ 1  ; U)  is  linear  and  continuous  in  u  when 
L”(sZ;  R)  is  endowed  with  the  weak- *  topology,  it  is  easy  to  check  that OPTIMAL  CARTEL  EQUILIBRIA  245 
~(4)  and  F  are  convex,  and  by  Alaoglu’s  theorem  [ll  ],  weak-”  compact. 
Since  (q, Z;)  is  admissible  w.r.t.  co(W),  F  is  nonempty  and  by  the 
Krein-Milman  theorem,  F  has  an  extreme  point.  In  what  follows  we show 
that  each  extreme  point  ii  of  F  has  the  bang-bang  property  that 
U(P)E  {w, W}  for  all  PEG?. 
The  proof  is  by  contradiction.  Assume  that  U  is  an  extreme  point  of F, 
but  there  exists  a  set  McQ  of  positive  (Lebesgue)  measure  such  that 
@f  4 (w, Jq  f  or  each  p~A4.  Without  loss  of  generality,  we  can  assume 
that  there  exists  E >  0  such  that  z?(M) G  [w +  E, W-E]  (see,  for  example, 
Proposition  14,  p. 61  in  Royden  [ll]). 
Let  m  be  the  cardinality  of  3.  Partition  M  into  m  +  1  sets  M(k), 
k=  I,...,  m  +  1,  of  positive  measure.  Define  the  matrix  A =  (o,,~)  in  the 
following  way: 
+  = i M(k) g(P;  tN-  1) ’ 4 +  Y) 4  for  all  y E S  and  all  ,k =  I,...,  M  +  1. 
Let  XEIY+~  be  a  non-zero  solution  of  A.  x =O  with  /xkj  <E  for  all 
k  =  I,...,  m  +  1.  Such  a  solution  exists  because  A  has  m  rows  and  IPZ  +  1 
columns.  Define  the  function  u: 52 --, f-s,  c) by  2:  =  Crz,’  xk.  xMckt,  where 
xMCk) is  the  characteristic  function  of  M(k).  Since  (u+  u)+zL”(Q;  co(W)) 
and  E,6y,q.e,~,;u+v)=El(y,q.e,_,;u)  for  all  YES,  (C+U)EF. 
Similarly  (U -  v) E F.  However  ii =  (U +  v)/2  $  (ii  -  v)/2,  contradicting  the 
fact  that  U is  extreme.  Therefore  ii:  D  -+  {p,  W 1 as asserted. 
Finally,  since  { 1?-‘,  I+>  c  W,  (q, U) is admissible  w.r.t.  W. 
Let  W  be  any  compact  subset  of  R,  and  define  w  =  mm  W  and 
W =  max  W. An  immediate  consequence  of Proposition  4  is that 
5.  COMPACTNESS  OF  V 
If  the  bang-bang  result  is  to  be applied  to  the  set  V, the  compactness  of 
the  latter  must  first  be  established.  Self-generation  and  Proposition  3 itself 
furnish  an  elegant  line  of proof.  We  begin  by  showing  that  the  operator 
preserves  compactness. 
PROPQSITION  4.  Let  WG  R be compact. Then B(W)  is compact. 
ProojI  By  Proposition  3, B(W)  =  B(co(  W)).  We  show that  B(co(  W))  is 
compact.  Let  p(q)  be  as  defined  in  Proposition  3.  Then  B(co(  W)) = 
UqEsE~I:(q.en)xAq)l.  S’  mce  p(q)  is  compact  for  each  9 E S,  E,  is  con- 
tinuous  in  U, and  3  is finite,  B(co(  W))  is compact  as required.  QED. 266  AEXEU,  PEARCE,  AND  STACCHETTI 
COROLLARY  2.  V is compact. 
Proof:  Notice  that  IV1 c  W,  implies  B( W,)  E  B( W,)  (the  operator  B  is 
monotone).  Let  cl(V)  denote  the  closure  of  V.  Since  V  is  bounded  (see 
Sect. 2),  cl(V)  is  compact.  B(cl(  V))  contains  B(V)  =  V,  by  monotonicity, 
and  by  Proposition  4  B(cl(  V))  is  compact.  Hence  cl(V)  c  B(cl(  V)), 
therefore  Proposition  1 implies  cl(V)  E  V,  that  is,  V is  closed,  and  hence 
compact.  Q.E.D. 
Recall  that  (A5)  implies  V is  nonempty. 
COROLLARY  3.  Let  V =  max  V and  _v  =  min  V.  Then 
z?=max{E,(q.e,;  u)l(q,  u)  is admissible  w.r.t.  V}, 
and 
_v=min(E,(q.e,;  u)l (q,  u) is admissible  w.r.t.  V}. 
Proof.  U =  max  B(V)  and  _v  =  min  B(V)  by  Proposition  2.  Q.E.D. 
6.  THE  ELEMENTARY  INTERTEMPORAL  STRUCTURE  OF SSE’s 
The  results  of the  last  two  sections  make  it  possible  to  simplify  further 
the  equilibria  that  support  elements  of  V. We  show that  for  every  w  E  V, 
there  exists  an  SSE  with  value  w,  that  is  completely  described  by  three 
quantities  and  three  subsets of n.  If  w  =  V or _u,  only  two  quantities  and  two 
subsets  are  required.  These  two  quantities  are  the  only  ones  produced  in 
the  equilibrium  in  question,  the  alternation  between  them  constituting  a 
Markov  process.  A  further  application  of these  results  occurs  in  the  proof 
(given  later  in  this  section)  of the  monotonicity  of maximal  symmetric  car- 
tel  profits  in  the  discount  rate  6. 
Recall  that  the  profile  I  was constructed  in  Section  3 (for  any  w  E V) 
by  choosing,  for  each  CC  E V, a  pair  (Q(G),  U(G))  that  was admissible  with 
respect  to  V,  and  satisfied  G =  E,  (Q(G),...,  Q(G);  U(G)).  Proposition  3 
shows  that  this  pair  can  always  be  chosen  such  that  the  range  of  the 
function  U(G)  is  simply  (3,  fi>.  In  what  follows  we  assume  that  the 
functions  Q  and  U  were  indeed  chosen  this  way.  A  trivial  argument 
establishes  that  for  any  w  E V,  only  two  quantities  are  ever  produced  after 
period  1  in  the  equilibrium  6(w).  In  period  t 3  2,  the  production  level  is 
Q( U’-  ‘(w)(p’+  ‘)),  which  is  either  Q(C) =  4  or  Q(a)  =  4  (depending  on 
p’-l),  since  u  and  y  are  the  only  values  that  U’-‘(w)($F’)= 
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For  any  G’, U(G)  partitions  price  space  into  a “reward”  region,  in  which 
U(%)(p)  =  V, and  a “punishment”  region,  in  which  U(G)(p)  =_v. 
region  and  its  complement  as follows: 
R(G)  =  (p  E Q  U(lG)(p)  =  IT>, 
R’(G)  =  {p  E Q  U(G)(p)  =k‘}. 
Let  R=  R(C)  and  fc’=  R”(u).  In  the  first  perio  of  the  SSE  B(w),  eat 
firm  produces  Q(W),  and  some  price  p( 1)  is generated.  If p( 1) fall 
second-period  production  is  4,  and  third-period  pro  ction  is  d 
by  whether  or  not  p(2)  belongs  to  the  favorable  set  If  instead 
in  R”(w),  second-period  production  is q, and  third-period  production  is  4 if 
p(2)  is  in  67, or  4 otherwise.  In  any  period  t >  2, either  the  favorable  regi- 
is  in  effect  (firms  are  producing  4  and  enjoying  relatively  high  expecte 
profits)  or  an  unfavorable  regime  is  operative  (firms  produce  4,  a  higher, 
less  profitable  quantity  except  in  the  degenerate  case  where  4 =g). 
Associated  with  these  states  are  the  reward  regions  R  and  R’,  respectively. 
The  regime  in  period  t +  1 is favorable  if and  on1  if p(t)  lies  in  the  reward 
region  associated  with  the  regime  of  period  r.  ence,  6(w)  is  described 
entirely  by  the  quantities  Q(w),  4,  and  q, and  th  eward  regions  R(w),  R, 
and  8”.  Of course  if w is  13  or y,  only  two quantities and regions are involved. 
A  probability  measure  is  induced  on  price  space  by  equilibrium  behavior 
(given  some  history);  the  probability  measures  the  sets R  and  &  give  the 
probabilities  of  remaining  in  the  reward  and  unishment  states,  respec- 
tively. 
The  next  result  concerns  the  sensitivity  of maximal  symmetric  profits  to 
changes  in  the  discount  rate.  Since  this  requires  reference  to  two  different 
sets V  (one  for  each  discount  rate)  and  two  functions  B,  we now  make  the 
dependence  on  6 explicit  by  writing  V(6),  U(6),  g(6),  R(W;  a),  and  so  on 
PROPOSITION  5 (Monotonicity  in  discount  factor).  Lei  6,  ancl S2 he  tu’o 
discount factors  such that  0 < 6 1  <  d2  <  1. Then 
(1)  ((1-S*l/S,).~(~z)~((l-S1)/~1).~(~1), 
(2)  6(1-62)/s2)‘(21(~2)-23(62))~((1-~1)/~!j.(u(6,)-zlj6,)) 
That  is, $6)  and the length of  the interval  co( V(S))  are increasing in 6, evelz 
when discounted profits  are “normalized”  by  the ,&actor (1 -  6)/6. 
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For  each  y E R,  let  [y]  denote  the  constant  function  from  52 into  {y }.  It 
is  easy  to  check  that  if  (q, U)  is  admissible  with  respect  to  V(6,), 
(q, u +  [r])  is admissible  with  respect  to  W,  for  all  y E [cc, a].  Let  (4, U) be 
admissible  with  respect  to  V(6,)  and  satisfy  E,(q.  e,;  U, 6,)=  $6,).  Then 
(4, U-t  [a])  is  admissible  with  respect  to  W,  and 
El(~~eN;u+[I~l,6,)=b, 
i 
7il(cj.eN)+J’  ii(p).g(p;N.q)dp+a 
n  I 
=  6, 7261)  - 
(  !  7+Cr 
1 
By  a  similar  argument,  there  exists  (g, _u) admissible  with  respect  to 
V(6,)  such  that  E1(g.e,;_u,6,)=_v(6,)  and  E,(g.e,;_u+  [cr],  6,)= 
~(6,)  +  _a. Thus  W c  B( W, ; 6,).  By  Proposition  3,  B( W, ; 6,)  = B( W; 6,). 
Hence,  by  Proposition  1,  WC  V(6,),  and 
v(6,)3v(6,)+a  and  _v(&) <a(s,)  +cr. 
The  reader  may  verify  that  these  inequalities  imply  (1)  and  (2)  above. 
Q.E.D. 
7.  CONCLUSION 
This  paper  shows  that  every  SSE  payoff  in  the  Green-Porter  model 
[4,  S]  can  be  supported  by  sequential  equilibria  that  are  easily  described, 
and  are  extremely  simple  in  their  intertemporal  structure.  In  every  period 
of  the  optimal  SSE  (and  in  all  but  the  first  period  of  any  SSE),  firms 
produce  according  to  one  of  two  “regimes,”  corresponding  to  the  first 
periods  of the  best  and  worst  SSE’s,  respectively.  The  alternation  between 
the  two  regimes  resulting  from  equilibrium  behavior  is  a  Markov  process. 
Potential  complexities  such  as  employing  varying  severities  of 
“punishment”  depending  on  how far  a price  realization  is from  its  “normal” 
range,  or  making  the  set of prices  that  trigger  a  change  from  the  favorable 
to  the  unfavorable  regime  depend  on  recent  price  history,  do  not  arise. 
These  and  other  results  are  derived  by  reducing  the  repeated  game  to  a 
static  structure  that  is far  more  accessible  for  the  purpose  of analysis.  This 
technique  also  enables  us  to  work  with  much  weaker  assumptions  than 
those  invoked  in  earlier  papers  on  this  subject.  Apart  from  minor  regularity 
conditions,  the  cost  and  inverse  demand  functions  are  unrestricted,  and  the 
stochastic  nature  of demand  is  modelled  in  quite  a  general  way. OPTIMAL  CARTEL  EQUILIBRIA  269 
While  the  paper  has  focused  exclusively  on  the  Green-Porter  model,  it 
demonstrates  an  approach  to  the  study  of repeated  games  that  might  be  of 
broader  interest.  The  factorization  and  self-generation  properties  of  Sec- 
tion  3  in  particular  have  analogues  in  many  classes  of  supergames.  Such 
results  are  available,  for  example,  for  the  simple  strategy  profiles  of Abreu 
[i],  and  yield  an  alternative  proof  of  the  existence  of  an  optimal  simple 
penal  code.  Adaptation  of the  function  B  to  particular  strategic  situations 
should  permit  productive  analysis  of many  repeated  games  heretofore  con- 
sidered  intractable. 
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